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NOTE
Eritrean Land Reform: The Forgotten Masses
I. Introduction
In May 1993, after nearly three decades of armed struggle, the
nation of Eritrea formally proclaimed its independence from
Ethiopia by popular referendum.' One of the results of the
independence movement was the widespread destruction of the
Eritrean countryside and infrastructure In response to this
tragedy, the Eritrean government implemented numerous state
programs to rebuild and reform the nation. In 1994 the
government adopted the Land Proclamation,3 which initiated a
nationwide land reform program vesting ownership of all land in
the government while granting limited usufructuary rights to
Eritreans and providing land leases for domestic and foreign
investors. The stated purpose of the Land Proclamation is to:
assure agricultural and industrial development; promote or
' See Jonathan M. Lindsay, Creating a Legal Framework for Land Registration in
Eritrea: Consolidated Final Report of the International Legal Consultant, U.N. Food
and Agriculture Organization, Main Report, at 9, U.N. Doc. TCP/ERI/4554 (1997)
[hereinafter Main Report].
2 See TESFA G. GEBREMEDHIN, BEYOND SURVIVAL: THE ECONOMIC CHALLENGES
OF AGRICULTURE & DEVELOPMENT IN POST-INDEPENDENCE ERrrREA 5-6 (1996). The war
claimed the lives of over 150,000 Eritreans, destroyed tons of crops, and almost 70% of
the livestock. See id. at 5. It had been estimated that, in 1993, about 75% of the
population was dependent on food aid. See id. at 6. Further, the majority of the
infrastructure including roads, banks, postal service, and rail service deteriorated
substantially. See id.
3 ERI. PROC. No. 58/1994, in Creating a Legal Framework for Land Registration
in Eritrea: Consolidated Final Report of the International Legal Consultant, supra note
1, Annex F.
' See The Economist Intelligence Unit, Eritrea Country Profile 1997, available on
THE ECONOMIST INTELLIGENCE UNIT CD-ROM, COUNTRY REPORTS: SUB-SAHARAN
AFRICA (Dec. 28, 1997). Black's Law Dictionary defines usufructuary rights as an
individual's right to enjoy property that he does not own. See BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1544 (6th ed. 1990).
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assure initiative and motivation among beneficiaries and
producers; encourage private investment and initiative; avoid
contradiction, friction, and dispute; pave way for the
improvement of the living standard of the people of Eritrea; be
standard and applicable throughout the nation; and ... replace[]
the existing progress-impeding system of land tenure in Eritrea
[with] a new and dynamic system.5
Though broad and ambitious, the Eritrean Land Proclamation
does not address directly the property rights of indigenous
pastoralists whose survival is intricately tied to the land.6 The
primary focus of this, Note will be on the potential legal rights of
pastoralists to Eritrean land absent legislation defining those
rights. Part II briefly outlines the relevant history of land use
within Eritrea.7 Next, Part III examines the Land Proclamation
itself.8 Part IV describes the land tenure systems in other African
nations that have undergone extensive land reform. 9 Finally, Part
V concludes that the Eritrean government will likely adopt the
unfavorable policy of passive settlement towards the nomadic
pastoralists rather than a more equitable alternative, such as
protected open range herding.'°
II. Background
A. Traditional Land Systems
At present the Land Proclamation is the most important legal
5 ER. PROC. No. 58/1994, in Creating a Legal Framework for Land Registration
in Eritrea: Consolidated Final Report of the International Legal Consultant, supra note
1, Annex F, at 1.
6 See generally ERI. PROC. No. 58/1994, in Creating a Legal Framework for Land
Registration in Eritrea: Consolidated Final Report of the International Legal
Consultant, supra note 1, at Annex F (illustrating that the Land Proclamation fails to
address directly the property rights of indigenous pastoralists). Article 48 of the Land
Proclamation states that "all villages in Eritrea shall, according to local custom, use their
own pasture and wood." Id. at 16. This is the only place within the proclamation that
mentions communal property rights.
I See infra notes 11-99 and accompanying text.
8 See infra notes 100-12 and accompanying text.
I See infra notes 113-85 and accompanying text.
10 See infra notes 186-88 and accompanying text.
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document in Eritrea regarding land and its use." The Proclamation
brings with it the potential for great change and reform. It is,
however, impossible to understand the new legal system governing
all real property rights within Eritrea without first acknowledging
the traditional land tenure systems that developed before 1994.12
The geography of the nation determines the use and value of
the land in Eritrea. 3  Eritrea is made up of three distinct
geographical areas: the highland plateau, the western lowlands,
and the coastal area along the Red Sea. 4 The geographic areas
divide the nation's population both ethnically and religiously. 5
Tigrinya-speaking Christians, who engage in "sedentarized
agriculture," predominantly inhabit the highland plateau.' 6 The
Beni-Amer and the others who historically have lived in the
western lowlands practice pastoralism and agropastoralism. 7 The
Arabic-speaking Afar and Saho population of the coastal area, also
known as the Danakalia, engage in pastoralism. I" Approximately
eighty percent of the Eritrean population lives in rural areas, and of
that eighty percent, "twenty-five to thirty percent of the population
are nomadic or semi-nomadic."' 9
While it is difficult to generalize about the traditional land
tenure systems in each of these areas, some broad categories of
land use can be identified.2 ° The varieties of rural land tenure
systems that have traditionally existed in Eritrea stem from the
country's cultural traditions, population density, land capacity, and
" See Main Report, supra note 1, at 10, 13.
12 See id. at 13.
" See id. at 13-14.
14 See Sandra Fullerton Joireman, The Minefield of Land Reform: Comments on





19 GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 12; Joireman, supra note 14, at 271 (explaining
that 60% of the population engage solely in agriculture, 35% practice agropastoralism,
and 5% pursue a pastoralist lifestyle).
o See Main Report, supra note 1, at 14.
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colonial influences.2' The most important of these tenure systems
for the majority of Eritreans are those held in common. 2 Within
these communal systems, the entire village or extended family
holds rights to land. Often, communal systems allow the land to
be cultivated but generally not to the exclusion of any individual.24
One such type of communal holding, commonly practiced by
agriculturalists in the highlands, was known as diessa, or
"residence-based communal tenure."25 Under this system the land
of the village was reallocated among the villagers on a rotational
basis every five to seven years.26 To qualify for a portion of the
land, a male resident of the village would first have to marry and
create a household separate from his parents. 27 These members of
the village, also known as Ballabats, were the only community
members allowed a portion of the village's arable land.2' The land
of the village could not be sold or inherited, and it reverted back to
the village upon death.29  Often village custom and law would
allow single widows with children, orphans, and widowers a one-
half share of the community's land.3° The diessa land tenure
system held all pasture land out for communal use.3'
21 See id.; see also Joireman, supra note 14, at 271 (illustrating colonial influences
on Eritrean land reform).
22 See Tesfa G. Gebremedhin, Constraints to a Viable Agricultural Development in
Eritrea, 1 ERI. STUD. REV. 95, 122-23 (1996).
23 See id. (describing how, under communal land-tenure systems, individual
farmers have usufructuary rights but do not have rights to the "exclusive use of the
land").
24 See id. at 123.
25 Joireman, supra note 14, at 271; see also Main Report, supra note 1, at 14
(defining the diessa land-tenure system).
26 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 271; Main Report, supra note 1, at 14.
27 See Kidane Mengisteab, Rehabilitation of Degraded Land in Eritrea's
Agricultural Policy: An Exploratory Study, in EMERGENT ERITREA: CHALLENGES OF
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 109, 109 (Gebre Hiwet Tesfagiorgis ed., 1993);
GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 25.
28 See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 25. Ballabats are those residents who have
descended from the village's founding fathers. See id.
29 See id. at 25-26.
30 See id. at 25.
"' See Mengisteab, supra note 27, at 110.
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The highlands, in particular, supported a second type of
communal land use: risti (risty).32 In the risti tenure system, only
those families-the Enda 33-- descended from a village's founders
held rights to arable land.4 This extended family system denied an
individual the power to devise separate shares of land to different
children and disallowed the disinheritance of any offspring.35
Risti, therefore, was more equitable than the diessa system because
male and, sometimes, female siblings inherited equal portions of
land.36 Individuals could also own land in more than one village if
they could prove direct lineage from the founders of those
villages.37 Further, a landholder held the right to cultivate his land
and lease it to others but could only sell his land with the consent
of the entire extended family. In addition, all pastureland was
held in common, similar to that in the diessa system.39
While these two types of land tenure systems dominated rural
village life throughout Eritrea, they do not reflect all of the various
traditional pastoralist land systems.40  Traditionally, pastoralists
have comprised a substantial portion of the rural population of
Eritrea.4 1
Within Eritrea, pastoral groups can be broadly categorized as
nomadic pastoralists, agropastoralists, and sedentary pastoralists.42
32 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 271; GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 23.
33 Enda is defined as the extended family of a village's founding settler. See
GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 22.
34 See id.
35 See Mengisteab, supra note 27, at 110.
36 See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 23.
37 See id.
38 See Mengisteab, supra note 27, at 110.
39 See id.
40 Villages practicing primarily agriculture within the diessa and risti models
experience few internal land disputes, while those that practice an intermixed system of
agriculture and pastoralism often experience disputes over village boundaries. See Main
Report, supra note 1, at 15.
41 See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 46.
42 See id. at 45-46. Pastoralism is the practice of herding as the primary economic
activity of a society. See THE RANDOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE
1419 (2d ed. 1987). Agropastoralists practice a combination of agriculture and livestock
production. See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 13.
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While all three of these groups are greatly dependent on their
animal stock for wealth and security, they each view land tenure
differently. 3 Among the pastoralists, communal land use systems
range from unrestricted open access to pastoral land to community
affiliated lands open to one or several groups."
The living patterns of the three types of nomadic pastoralists
vary. Traditional nomadic groups in Eritrea do not encumber
themselves with permanent residences, or tie themselves to the
land by engaging in agricultural practices.4 ' These nomadic
pastoralists move freely about the semi-arid lowlands and coastal
46areas in search of water and land where their livestock may graze.
Agropastoralists live within semi-permanent villages in the
Western lowland regions near water and land resources that are
able to sustain farming and livestock grazing. 47 They move their
herds of livestock as water and grazing needs dictate. 4  When
resources become scarce, they abandon their villages. 9
Sedentary pastoralists constitute the third classification of
pastoralists found in Eritrea. Members of this group live in
permanent residences and cultivate' some crops among the
highland plateaus but rely predominantly on their livestock for
subsistence.0 The milk and meat provided by the herds is vital to
all pastoralists."
B. Colonial Influence
Traditional land tenure systems have changed in character over
the decades due to colonial influences, population and livestock
increases, and war." In 1890 Italy joined the rest of Europe in the
43 See Main Report, supra note 1, at 14.
44 See id.
41 See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 45.
46 See id. at 45-46.
47 See id.; Joireman, supra note 14, at 270.
48 See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 46.
49 See id.
50 See id. at 45-46; Joireman, supra note 14, at 270.
51 See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 46.
52 See Mengisteab, supra note 27, at 111-12.
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colonization of Africa.". For the next fifty-seven years, Eritrea was
an Italian colony. 4 The influence of Italian administration on land
tenure was wide reaching."
In 1909 and 1926, the Italian government nationalized large
sections of land throughout Eritrea.56 It designated these tracts as
demaniale, or government land." Although much of the
expropriated land fell within the control of local villages and
pastoralists, the colonial government classified it as "unoccupied"
and granted much of it to Italian farmers.5
As the Italian occupation continued, the colonial government
expropriated the most fertile lands for Italian colonists. 9 This
effectively restricted pastoralists in the lowland areas from using
the best and most suitable lands for grazing. 6° Furthermore, local
landlords, known as Diglals, held much of the arable lowland
61
areas that were not under the control of the colonial government.
The combined actions of the colonial government and the local
landlords forced a majority of the pastoral populations in the
lowlands into a state of landlessness.62 Since the majority of
pastoralists owned no land, they rented grazing tracts from the
colonial Italian government or local landlords. 3 The government
and feudal landlords exploited the nomadic people of the lowlands
13 See F.F. Russell, Eritrean Customary Law, 3 J. AFR. L. 99, 99 (1959).
4 See id.
5 See generally Mengisteab, supra note 27, at 110 (discussing Eritrean territory
seized by the Italian colonial government which has since been preserved as "state land"
by successive governments).
56 See Main Report, supra note 1, at 14.
17 See id.
58 See id.
9 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 271.
60 See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 46.
61 See id. Local chiefs in the lowlands would charge the pastoralists rents or
services in exchange for the use of the pastoral land under their tribes' control. See id.
Landed gentry, while constituting less than 2% of Eritrea's farming population, often
exploited the pastoralists for rents and services in exchange for the use of their land. See
id. at 40, 46. Feudal landlords no longer exist in post-independence Eritrea. See id. at
41.
62 See id. at 46.
63 See id.
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for tax purposes, labor, and a free supply of milk and meat.64
The Italian government's land policy also affected the
sedentary pastoralists. The new colonial government observed
that the rotationally-based diessa land tenure system was less
hostile to outsiders than the lineage-based risti system.6 ' The
government began actively to promote, in the highland plateaus,
the use of the diessa land tenure system over the risti system.66
The Italian occupation of Eritrea came to an end in 1941 with
the invasion of British forces during World War 11.67 Under
British rule land expropriation continued, especially in the
lowlands. 68 The British relocated onto the expropriated lands those
Italians who remained in Eritrea after the invasion.69
Having taken control of Eritrea, the British government began
to dismantle many of the land policies promulgated under colonial
Italian rule. The occupying British force deemed the communal-
based land tenure system of diessa, the land system promoted by
the Italian government, to be inferior to individual ownership.7
The British Military Administration (BMA) believed that "[1]and
should be allocated in individual plots or allotments and not to
communal groups."'" While the occupying British force advocated
individual land ownership in Eritrea, it did not implement any
widespread land reform. Thus, land rights in the lowlands
64 See id.
65 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 271.
66 See id.
67 See Russell, supra note 53, at 99. The British occupied Eritrea in 1941, but Italy
did not abandon its claim to it until 1947. See id. At the time of Eritrean liberation from
colonial Italian rule, some 70,000 Italians were living there. See Mengisteab, supra note
27, at 111.
61 See Mengisteab, supra note 27, at 111. British administration of Eritrea came to
an end on September 15, 1952. See Russell, supra note 53, at 99.
69 See Mengisteab, supra note 27, at 11. Strong resistance from local farming
populations, which culminated into several rebellions during the 1950s, met the British
when they expropriated and evicted individuals ,from their land. See GEBREMEDHIN,
supra note 2, at 29.
70 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 271.
71 Id.
72 See id. at 272.
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became more uncertain and muddled."
C. The Road to Revolution
In September 1952, in accordance with the wishes of the
General Assembly of the United Nations, Eritrea became a
federation of Ethiopia. 4  The Eritrean federation, to protect
property rights, added article 37 to its Eritrean constitution. This
article provided that:
Property rights and rights of a real nature, including those on
State lands, established by custom or law and exercised in
Eritrea by the tribes, the various population groups and by
natural and legal persons, shall not be impaired by any law of a
discriminatory nature."
While the constitutional provision guaranteed all citizens of
Eritrea freedom from discriminatory property laws, it did nothing
to reform the varied assortment of land systems present throughout
the country.76 Furthermore, the Ethiopian government made no
attempt to create a cohesive land tenure policy.77 The plight of the
pastoralists grew to the point that they became one of the most
oppressed and slighted populations in Eritrea.78
In 1962, after several years of strained relations between
Ethiopia and the Eritrean federation, Haile Selassie's Ethiopian
79government officially annexed Eritrea as an Ethiopian province.
71 See id.
71 See Russell, supra note 53, at 99; UNICEF, CHILDREN AND WOMEN IN ERITREA:
1994 17 (1994). After considering "(a) The wishes and welfare of the inhabitants of
Eritrea.... (b) The interests of peace and security in East Africa, [and] (c) The rights
and claims of Ethiopia based on geographical, historical, ethnic or economic reasons,
including in particular Ethiopia's legitimate need for adequate access to the sea," the
U.N. decided that Eritrea should become a federation of Ethiopia. G.A. Res. 390(V),
U.N. GAOR, 5th Sess., Supp. No. 20, at 20, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950).
75 ERi. CONST. pt. I, ch. 5, art. 37 (rendered moot by Ethiopia's 1962 annexation of
Eritrea), in ETHIOPIA AND ERITREA: A DOCUMENTARY STUDY 201, 211 (Habtu Ghebre-
Abed., 1993).
76 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 272.
77 See generally id. (describing how the Ethiopian government failed to develop a
cohesive land-tenure system until 1974, when Ethiopia became embroiled in a
revolution).
78 See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 46.
71 See Main Report, supra note 1, at 9.
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Armed conflict between Ethiopians and Eritreans soon grew into
open revolution. s°  The Eritrean highlands, under Ethiopian
influence, became dominated by a communal residence-based
system similar to the traditional diessa land tenure system." Due
to the strong rebel presence in the western areas of Eritrea,
however, no cohesive land tenure system reached the pastoralists
in the lowland areas." Thus, the multi-tenured system of land use
continued throughout the war.83
The war's effect on the pastoralists of Eritrea was mixed. The
two main liberation groups within Eritrea, the Eritrean Liberation
Front (ELF)" and the Eritrean People's Liberation Front (EPLF),85
recognized that land reform was necessary in order to promote
stability within the liberated areas.86 The ELF and the EPLF,
however, formed very different land tenure policies with respect to
pastoralists.87
The EPLF enticed nomadic pastoralist groups to settle in
villages and become farmers by providing them with both
veterinarian services for their cattle and education for their
80 See generally Mengisteab, supra note 27, at 112 (noting that the military
conflict between Ethiopia and Eritrea started in 1960 and ended in 1991). The Ethiopian
military placed a great strain on the Eritrean peasantry by burning villages and crops and
looting property. See id.
81 See generally Joireman, supra note 14, at 272 (describing how the Eritrean lands




84 See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 5. The ELF was the first organized
independence group. See id. Its principal membership consisted of those Eritrean
worker and peasantry groups that clamored for independence during colonial rule. See
id. The ELF gathered much of its support from pastoralists and those living in lowland
areas. See Joireman, supra note 14, at 273.
85 See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 5. The EPLF was organized after the ELF.
See id. It formed a broad-based coalition with several groups in Eritrea and later became
the dominant resistance group in the nation. See Joireman, supra note 14, at 273.
Further, the EPLF championed women's rights during and after the independence
movement. See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 72. It gained control of the entire
country in 1991. See Joireman, supra note 14, at 273.




children."8 It created the Agricultural Commission in 1975 in an
effort to execute an agricultural policy of self-reliance, which
would increase the food supply for its army. s9 By contrast, the
ELF championed the nomadic pastoralist way of life.90 The
divergent land reform policies of these groups reflected their
supporters' economic and political basis.9 The ELF gathered the
majority of its support from the lowland areas dominated by the
pastoralists, while the EPLF aligned itself with a variety of ethnic
92groups.
D. Independence Achieved
As the revolution dragged on, the EPLF became the dominant
resistance movement within Eritrea and, in 1991, gained control of
the entire nation.93 The EPLF recognized, early on, the problems
presented by the application of divergent land tenure systems in
Eritrea. 94  It began to consider some type of national land
reformation, even before Eritrean independence was officially
proclaimed.!5 In response to this need, the EPLF formed the
Eritrean Land Commission in 1993 with the directive to create a
cohesive national land tenure policy.
96
88 See id.
89 See The Agricultural Commission, EPLF, Problems, Prospective Policies and
Programs for Agricultural Development in Eritrea, in EMERGENT ERITREA:
CHALLENGES OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 89, 91 (Gebre Hiwet Tesfagiorgis ed., 1993).
The EPLF abandoned its plan to engage directly in farming, and the group's focus
moved towards assisting the peasantry with their problems in agricultural production.
See id.
' See Joireman, supra note 14, at 272. David Pool, in an article for the
Manchester Papers in Politics Working Papers Series, described an occasion where the
ELF encouraged farmers who attempted to expropriate pastoralist lands for agricultural
purposes to settle elsewhere. See id. at 272-73.
91 See id. at 273.
92 See id.
9' See id.
94 See id. In addition to the varied traditional land systems that were in effect, the
armies of the ELF and EPLF created several new types. See id. at 272. The EPLF
realized that the problem of land ownership would only grow as liberation troops
returned to their home villages. See id. at 273.
95 See id. at 273.
96 See id.
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The Commission researched and debated several different land
tenure systems.97 It considered reforming the nation's land use
policy through privatization, a return to the diessa system,
implementation of a modified diessa system with land rotation
every twenty years, and other similar plans.9' Believing that
traditional land systems in Eritrea were a hindrance to
development within the nation, the Land Commission proposed a
radical land reformation.99
III. The Land Proclamation
In 1994 Proclamation No. 58/1994, "The Land Proclamation,"
became the cornerstone of Eritrean land tenure.' The Land
Proclamation revolutionized land tenure in Eritrea by conferring
upon the state ownership of all land.'0 ' The Land Proclamation
created a system of individual usufruct rights in the land, while
allowing the government to retain final dispossession rights.
10 2
According to the Proclamation, land is to be distributed to all
citizens and also made available for lease.' 3 First, all citizens of
Eritrea, indiscriminate of sex, race, clan, or beliefs, have a usufruct
right to an allotment of land for housing, business, or agricultural
9' See id.
98 See id.
99 See Jonathan M. Lindsay, Creating a Legal Framework for Land Registration in
Eritrea: Consolidated Final Report of the International Legal Consultant, U.N. Food
and Agriculture Organization, Executive Summary, at 1, U.N. Doc. TCP/ER14554
(1997) [hereinafter Executive Summary]. The EPLF perceived that traditional systems
of land use impeded the growth and progress of the nation's agricultural sector. See id.
Traditional land use systems restricted the establishment of adequately-sized farms,
caused excessive subdivision of the land, and dissuaded farmers from making permanent
improvements to the land. See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 150. The development
of the agricultural sector in Eritrea is important to alleviate poverty and to protect the
environment. See id. at 156.
1o See Executive Summary, supra note 99, at 1.
101 See id.
112 See id.; Joireman, supra note 14, at 273. A return to a modified diessa system
and privatization were among those systems the Commission considered and rejected.
See Joireman, supra note 14, at 273. The Commission determined that these systems
did not create the uniformity of tenure the nation sought. See id.
103 See ERI. PROC. No. 58/1994, in Creating a Legal Framework for Land
Registration in Eritrea: Consolidated Final Report of the International Legal
Consultant, supra note 1, Annex F, at 3-4, 12.
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pursuits for their lifetimeY' 4 Each parcel of land may be leased,
but not sold, and inherited by a dependent if the dependent is
willing to relinquish his rights to any other land allocated to him
by the govemment.0 5 Second, all land that is not distributed by
the government will remain in the government's custody to be
administered by it.10 6  Lands that are administered by the
government will be leased to foreign investors, held in reserve for
mining and timber resources, and distributed to citizens as the
need arises. 1°7
Due to the all-encompassing nature of the Land Proclamation,
its implementation will have a powerful effect on most of the
individuals and groups within Eritrea.0 8 The Proclamation is
designed to promote capital investment on farms since individuals
are assured tenure in their allotment of land because the land will
not be redistributed in five to seven years as under the diessa
system.' °9 In addition, disputes over particular portions of land
will be easier to adjudicate after land holdings are registered and
104 See id. at 3-4, 6; Joireman, supra note 14, at 273.
1o5 See ER. PROC. No. 58/1994, in Creating a Legal Framework for Land
Registration in Eritrea: Consolidated Final Report of the International Legal
Consultant, supra note 1, Annex F, at 9-13; Joireman, supra note 14, at 273-74.
106 See ERI. PROC. No. 58/1994, in Creating a Legal Framework for Land
Registration in Eritrea: Consolidated Final Report of the International Legal
Consultant, supra note 1, Annex F, at 4.
107 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 273; see generally ER. PROC. No. 58/1994, in
Creating a Legal Framework for Land Registration in Eritrea: Consolidated Final
Report of the International Legal Consultant, supra note 1, Annex F, at 2-3 (noting that
land held by the government which has been designated "land requisite for development
and reconstruction" can be used for, among other things, capital investment, urban
expansion, mining, and industry).
'0' See Main Report, supra note 1, at 1. As of April 1997, the Land Proclamation
had yet to be implemented throughout Eritrea. See id. Initially, two pilot sites were
chosen for the Proclamation's trial run, but work at one of the sites has since been
suspended. See id. In December 1996 the Land Commission held a lottery to allocate,
in the village of Adi Guadid, the first parcels of land under the new system. See id. at
22. Commission personnel implemented the lottery when it became clear that there were
more villagers than parcels of land. See id. The fate of those not chosen in the lottery
was unclear at the time of the Lindsay report's publication. See id.
109 See generally id. at 7 (noting that land registration provides rightholders with
greater security, inducing them to invest in their land).
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recorded by the govemment." Evidence of boundaries and tenure
rights will be accessible to individuals seeking clarification of their
rights."'
While designed with the stated intent of accommodating
Eritrea's increasing population growth, providing opportunities for
implementing modern land use systems, and raising the nation's
living standard, the Land Proclamation has failed to consider the
needs of lowlands pastoralists and agropastoralists. 2  The Land
Proclamation, in fact, wholly ignores these groups. These groups
still exist within Eritrea, however, and a ruling must eventually be
made regarding their status within the new legal framework of
land rights.
The remainder of this Note is dedicated to exploring some
possible answers to this dilemma. A comparative study of other
nations in Africa that have faced these problems may give some
insight into the viable possibilities that exist. While the results are
varied, some policies have proven more effective than others.
IV. Analysis
A. "The Tragedy of the Commons"
It is impossible to understand the development of land tenure
110 See id. (describing how it has been argued that land registration reduces
boundary disputes).
"' See generally id. (illustrating that land registration provides evidence of land
boundaries). Critics, however, believe that there exist several potential drawbacks for
agriculturists under the current plan, including the possibility that land registration laws
will undermine traditional means of determining boundaries that already work well. See
id. at8.
112 See ERI. PROC. No. 58/1994, in Creating a Legal Framework for Land
Registration in Eritrea: Consolidated Final Report of the International Legal
Consultant, supra note 1, Annex F, at 1; Joireman, supra note 14, at 275. The Land
Proclamation does not address the rights of pastoralists directly. See generally ERI.
PROC. No. 58/1994, in Creating a Legal Framework for Land Registration in
Eritrea: Consolidated Final Report of the International Legal Consultant, supra note 1,
Annex F. (illustrating that the Land Proclamation fails to address directly the property
rights of indigenous pastoralists). Article 48 of the Proclamation speaks only to the use
of traditional village pasture land. See id. at 16. An indirect result of the Land
Proclamation and its redistribution of land rights has been the abolition of rural
landlords. See GEBREMEDHIN, supra note 2, at 46-47.
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reform in Africa, and its effects on nomadic pastoral populations,
without first acknowledging the underlying philosophical ideals
that govern land reform in this area of the world. In 1968 the
philosophical theory known as the "Tragedy of the Commons"
was introduced.' 3 The theory posits that land held in communal
ownership inevitably leads to the over-exploitation of natural
resources." 4 Since publication of "The Tragedy of the Commons,"
developing nations have used its hypothesis as the foundation for
land use policies that end communal ownership of resources."'
The "Tragedy of the Commons" theory begins with the
premise that all of those who graze their herds in common areas
have an incentive to use the land to their own advantage and to the
disadvantage of all others."16 In application this means that an
individual is motivated to overstock his herd."7 By overstocking,
the individual, in essence, receives a "free ride" because the costs
of overstocking would be deferred among all of those who use the
land, and only the individual will receive any benefit."'
It then follows that without enforcement of rules prohibiting
this type of behavior, all of those who use the common grazing
areas have an incentive to over-graze in order to take advantage of
the commons." 9 Following this thesis one step further, the only
conclusion that can be reached is that over-grazing and land
deterioration is inevitable.2  Within that lies the tragedy.
Communal property, according to "The Tragedy of the
113 See Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Sci. 1243 (1968).
114 See id. at 1244.
115 See Carlisle Ford Runge, The "Tragedy of the. Commons" and Resource
Management in Botswana, in A COLLOQUIUM ON ISSUES IN AFRICAN LAND TENURE 1, 1
(1985). The African nations that have encouraged individualized land holdings
reflecting the philosophy of "The Tragedy of the Commons" include Botswana, Ghana,
Kenya, Somalia, Uganda, and Zimbabwe. See Richard Barrows & Michael Roth, Land
Tenure and Investment in African Agriculture: Theory and Evidence, 28 J. MOD. AFR.
STUD. 205, 205 (1990).
116 See Runge, supra note 115, at 2.
117 See id.
118 See id.
"1 See id.; Barrows & Roth, supra note 115, at 207.
120 See Runge, supra note 115, at 2.
121 See id.
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Commons," is viewed as open access property that is owned and
maintained by no one." In the absence of secure, individualized
tenure, the incentive to continue "hit-and-run" grazing practices
• 1 2 3
remains. Thus, the only solution is a system of private
ownership that allows individuals to exclude others, preventing
over-grazing by creating a motive to manage and maintain the
land.124
Several African nations have attempted to apply the "Tragedy
of the Commons" scheme in their land reform policies. 125  The
most common method has been to entice pastoralists into
sedentary lifestyles within fixed boundaries, thus avoiding the
"Tragedy of the Commons" and granting the government greater
control over these groups.'26 Through governmental legislation or
through the enclosure of grazing areas, pastoralists can be
encouraged to adopt a more sedentary lifestyle.
2 7
When a government actively pursues the settlement of
nomadic pastoralists, it often eficounters high costs, including
policing costs.'28 Hence, the value of the grazing land for
commercial exploitation is appealing.2 The villagization program
122 See id. at 3.
123 Kyle W. Danish, International Environmental Law and the "Bottom-Up"
Approach: A Review of the Desertification Convention, 3 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD.
133, 140 (1995).
124 See Runge, supra note 115, at 2-3.
125 See Steven W. Lawry et al., Land Tenure Policy in African Livestock
Development, in A COLLOQUIUM ON ISSUES IN AFRICAN LAND TENURE 17, 17-18 (1985).
An explicit example of the application of "The Tragedy of the Commons" in Africa can
be seen in the land reform policies of Botswana in the 1970s. See id. In 1975 the
president of Botswana told that country's parliament that "[u]nder our communal
grazing system it is no one individual's interest to limit the number of his animals. If
one man takes his cattle off, someone else moves his cattle in. Unless livestock numbers
are somehow tied to specific grazing areas no one has an incentive to control grazing."
Id.
126 See Mengisteab, supra note 27, at 113.
127 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 280.
128 See id. A government which adopts a policy of forced settlement must provide
for infrastructure costs, expanded policing, and building materials for homes and
schools. See id.
129 See VICTOR AZARYA, NOMADS AND THE STATE IN AFRICA: THE POLITICAL ROOTS
OF MARGINALITY 76 (1996). Traditional grazing lands often have been converted, by
post-colonial African governments, into agricultural, mining, ranching, or wildlife tracts.
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in Tanzania is a good example of an active governmental
settlement plan.' 0
Tanzanian leaders considered, nomadic pastoralism to be a
"backward" system of land tenure.' The government, therefore,
attempted to place pastoralists in sedentary villages so as to
increase the production of the land and to further national
development.' The forced settlement caused a great deal of social
and economic upheaval throughout the nation."' Many people
found that their lands were being taken by the government and
redistributed to newly created villages.3 4  This, in turn, led to
numerous legal battles over the land rights of those who were
displaced.'35 In the end, Tanzania's forced pastoral settlement
program was deemed a failure by most international observers, and
the program was terminated.
6
Within the framework of the "Tragedy of the Commons,"
passive sedentary practices that invite voluntary settlement offer
many advantages over active governmental settlement programs.117
By distributing land to individuals and encouraging them to
develop it, the government passively encourages the enclosure and
See id.
130 See id. at 80.
131 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 281.
132 See id.; Simon Coldham, Land Tenure Reform in Tanzania: Legal Problems
and Perspectives, 33 MOD. AFR. STUD. 227, 228-29 (1995).
133 See Coldham, supra note 132, at 228-29. The government believed that
villagization would promote public service, create large-scale farming, and prevent
inequalities and exploitation of rural populations. See id. at 228.
134 See id. at 236.
13' See id. at 229-30. The high court of Tanzania in the 1980s dealt with this
problem by holding that the governmental interest in socializing the nation's land
system outweighed the interests of a few injured individuals. See id. at 230. Since that
time some relief has been offered by the government. See id.
136 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 281-82; AZARYA, supra note 129, at 80;
Coldham, supra note 132, at 228-29. Land disputes, distrust, new inequalities, and
exploitation resulted in many areas where the Tanzanian government implemented its
villagization program. See Coldham, supra note 132, at 229. No legal framework was
created to define the individual's rights over land that was farmed collectively or
specifically allocated. See id.
137 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 281.
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protection of these lands for non-communal use.13 Pastoralists
become restricted to smaller grazing areas, which effectively limits
the size of the herd maintained on the land.139 The pastoralists are
often forced either to accept the boundaries and become sedentary,
like their neighbors, or resist the enclosures.' °  Resistance can
precipitate violence. 141
B. "The Tragedy of the Commons" and Eritrea
The Eritrean Land Proclamation's implementation of
individual land holdings and its disregard for pastoralist rights
imply that the Eritrean government is encouraging settlement of
pastoralists 4 1 If the Eritrean Land Proclamation is placed within
the "Tragedy of the Commons" model, passive enforcement of
pastoralist settlement is a likely result.143  With the majority of
governmental resources directed towards implementation of the
Land Proclamation, active settlement programs become fiscally
impossible.' 4  The Land Proclamation, however, does provide for
the enclosure of each allotment. 145 As more land is enclosed, the
pastoralist will be forced to retreat to smaller and more marginal
grazing areas or to accept sedentarization.1 46  The disregard for
nomadic pastoralists in the lowlands may cause long-term
instability that could be detrimental to Eritrean development.'
47
Furthermore, the traditional political and economic basis of the
Eritrean government under the EPLF gives some indication of the
l38 See id. at 280-8 1.





'44 See generally id. (describing how Eritrea will likely encourage passive enclosure
as opposed to implementing an active settlement program because of limited state
funds).
145 See ERI. PROC. No. 58/1994, in, Creating a Legal Framework for Land
Registration in Eritrea: Consolidated Final Report of the International Legal
Consultant, supra note 1, Annex F, at 9. Article 19 provides the usufructuary with the
right to fence in any land provided to him by the government. See id.
146 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 281.
"41 See id. at 278-79.
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government's attitude towards pastoralists.' 48  The EPLF, as a
matter of policy, favors sedentary practices over pastoralism.1
49
Modern African history, moreover; illustrates that the fate of
pastoralists within African society is intricately tied to their
allegiances during the independence movements. ° While some
groups, such as the Moors in Mauritania, retained freedom of
movement by allying themselves with the governing political
faction during the transition to independence, many other pastoral
groups have not been so fortunate.51 .
Groups such as the nomadic Fulbe in Mali and Cameroon have
lost much of their power since independence.'52 The post-colonial
ruling coalitions in these nations excluded the Fulbe.5 3 The Fulbe,
as a result, lost large land holdings, representation in local
government, and, due to state imposed quotas, a significant portion
of their livestock to the newly empowered governments. 
154
While newly independent nations in Africa often follow the
"Tragedy of the Commons" model, the system has become
discredited as overly simplistic and harmful by many observers.5
In arid areas where agriculture cannot completely support the
population, pastoralism has been shown to be a positive method of
production. 56 In fact, over-grazing does not occur in many areas
where pastoralists exist because- of their heightened awareness of
the environment. 157  Governments often advocate forms of
148 See id.
14 See generally The Agricultural Commission, supra note 89 (noting, in the EPLF
paper, the absence of an outlined, policy initiative to protect pastoralist rights to grazing
lands).
lSO See AZARYA, supra note 129, at 69.
1'1 See id. at 73.
152 See id. at 71-72.
1"' See id at 7 1.
154 See id. Those who had no political connections and were dependent on cattle
have suffered greatly since independence. See id. at 72.
"I See Ahmed Yusuf Farah, The Plight & the Prospects of Ethiopia's Lowland
Pastoral Groups, in IN SEARCH OF COOL GROUND: WAR, FLIGHT & HOMECOMING IN
NORTHEAST AFRICA 124, 130 (Tim Allen ed., 1996); Joireman, supra note 14, at 281-82;
Runge, supra note 115, at 1; Lawry, supra note 125, at 19-20.
156 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 282.
157 See Farah, supra note 155, at 130.
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production which underestimate the effectiveness of traditional
systems of pastoral production.'58  By remaining mobile,
pastoralist groups are able to take advantage of seasonal grazing
patterns, thus avoiding over-grazing.'5 9
C. "The Tragedy of the Commons" and Compromise
While several African nations acknowledge the shortcomings
of the "Tragedy of the Commons" model, they often hesitate to
move away from individual land tenure systems.' 6 In response to
this dilemma, some countries are attempting to create a policy of
compromise. Kenya, for example, implemented a compromise
system. 162
In Kenya, the Swynnerton plan of land consolidation created
individual land holdings during the 1950s. 63 The traditional tribal
trust lands of the Maasai (Masai) pastoralists held great potential
for agricultural production, and many farmers and progressive
Maasai began to settle and to enclose large areas of the land. '61 It
was felt that without governmental direction, the nomadic Maasai
would be forced to range their herds on only the driest and most
marginal lands.
65
The post-colonial government of Kenya recognized the
problems of the Maasai and sought to convert tribal trust land into
group ranches. 166  The group ranch system was a compromise
between allowing pastoralists to continue to range freely and the
158 See AGGREY AYUEN MAJOK & CALVIN W. SCHWABE, DEVELOPMENT AMONG
AFRICA'S MIGRATORY PASTORALISTS 111 (1996).
159 See Farah, supra note 155, at 130.
'6 See Lawry, supra note 125, at 19.
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 See Barrows & Rth, supra note 115, at 209.
164 See id. at 211.
165 See id. (quoting Simon F.R. Coldham, Land-Tenure Reform in Kenya: The
Limits of Law, 17 J. MOD. AFR. STUD. 615, 621 (1979)).
166 See generally AZARYA, supra note 129, at 80 (noting that, after independence,




government's need to create a system of secure freeholds.'67 This
system allowed groups of pastoralists to own large tracts of land
for grazing by registering their land together. 16  While the
registered land gave the owners exclusive grazing rights on that
parcel, the owners would commonly allow neighboring groups to
use the land so as not to offend traditional customs of
reciprocity. 69
While there were several problems with the group ranch
system, many Maasai accepted the program as a way to protect
their lands from ambitious farmers and land speculators. 7o In
1989, however, the Kenyan government reversed its stance and
decreed that the program would not be a viable alternative in the
future and that all group ranches should be subdivided into
individual land holdings. 7' The subdivision of the group ranches
into individual land tenures led to the sale of Maasai land to non-
Maasai.17 Further, the inability of the Maasai to practice their
traditional conservation practices resulted in overcrowding and
environmental deterioration of traditional Maasai land. 73
Although the group ranch system failed in Kenya, its basic
premise is still sound. The group ranch system may be a viable
alternative for Eritrean pastoralists. This compromise can be
implemented more effectively if the pastoralist groups are allowed




170 See Lawry, supra note 125, at 19. The group ranches, however, did not coincide
with traditional cattle management See Joy K. Asiema & Francis D.P. Situma,
Indigenous Peoples and the Environment: The Case of the Pastoral Maasai of Kenya, 5
COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 149, 162 (1994). In addition, the group ranches in
Kenya were undermined by the fact that the ranch managers had no traditional
legitimacy and that members would invite outsiders to live on the ranches, undercutting
the very policy behind converting communal lands into freeholds. See id.
"I' See Asiema, supra note 170, at 163. The Kenyan government likely terminated
the group ranches because it did not want to admit that it failed in its attempt to guide
the lives of the Maasai. See id.
172 See id. at 164-65.
' See id. at 165.
17' See generally id. at 162-66 (describing the reasons for the failure of group
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Careful planning can help avoid the problems that plagued the
Maasai in Kenya." 5 Since all of the land is vested in the Eritrean
government and the government has the power to grant usufruct
rights over the land, the creation of group ranches are plausible.
The ranch system will grant lowland pastoralists protective land
rights that will prevent the incursion of farmers on their land. For
the program to work, the government needs to take an active role
in designing the group ranch system in conjunction with the
pastoralists.
D. A Return to Communal Tenure
The government should explore a third alternative for the
pastoralists in Eritrea, the preservation of communal tenure, before
any conclusive actions are taken. As many in the international
community have become aware of the failed and discredited
policies underlying the "Tragedy of the Commons" model, there is
a renewed interest in communal land tenure among scholars. 1
76
In many situations, communal tenure is the best economic and
ecological alternative.7 7 Most pastoralists thrive economically in
communal tenure systems." Few livestock holdings in Africa
exceed one hundred. head of cattle. 179  Division of land into
individual lease or usufruct holdings in ard areas, such as the
Eritrean lowlands, effectively denies many pastoralists access to
adequate water and fodder supplies."O
Communal land tenure, ecologically, is superior to individual
ranches in Kenya, including the Maasai's lack of an effective governmental lobby, while
noting that group ranches did have one advantage: traditional Maasai grazing lands
remained under Maasai control).
171 See supra notes 163-73 and accompanying text.
176 See generally Lawry, supra note 125, at 26-27 (illustrating that converting
communal land into individualized freeholds has not solved the problems associated
with communal land tenure, while noting that communal land use remains important to
pastoral production); see also Runge, supra note 115, at 1 (noting that the "Tragedy of
the Commons" model is "an erroneous and inaccurate description of many problems of
common resource use").
177 See Lawry, supra note 125, at 26.
171 See id. at 19.
179 See id.
"0 See id. at 19-20.
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land tenure in many situations. 8' Due to the arid conditions of the
Eritrean lowlands and the seasonal rain patterns, pastoral herds
require large areas in which to seek subsistence.12 It is often
necessary for pastoralists to respond quickly to changes in
seasonal rainfall.'83 The transient nature of resources requires a
flexible land tenure system. I1 4  It will be nearly impossible to
develop an individual land tenure program that will adequately
meet the seasonal needs of lowland pastoralists.'
Each of the land systems presented has strengths and
weaknesses. The systems reflect different policy goals advocated
by the ruling governments. Moreover, each land tenure system
has the potential to bring increased stability to Africa if
implemented correctly. Eritrea must decide which system is best
for its citizens.
V. Conclusion
The Eritrean Land Proclamation is a bold and decisive
program that creates an equitable land tenure system for the
majority of Eritreans. The Proclamation, however, does not speak
to the land tenure needs of lowland pastoralists. It disregards the
multitude of studies and experiences that demonstrate both the
value of pastoral activities in arid areas and the difficulties
encountered when attempting to settle nomadic groups. 1 6 The
Eritrean government must consider and implement land tenure
policies to govern pastoralist lowlanders. This Note sets forth
three alternative land tenure systems that should be considered by
the Eritrean government. Each system must be judged on its
inherent strengths and weaknesses.
First, African nations continue to use the "Tragedy of the
Commons" pastoral model as a method of settling pastoralists.
While many disavow the fundamental philosophy underlying this
181 See id.
182 See id. at 19.
183 See id.
'8 See id. at 19-20.
185 See id. at 20.
186 See Joireman, supra note 14, at 282.
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approach to settling pastoralists, it has found acceptance in African
nations seeking to maximize the benefits of individual land tenure.
Pastoralists, however, are often unwilling to give up their
traditional lifestyle voluntarily. The land occupied by the
pastoralists is often better suited for their nomadic lifestyle than
for agricultural production.187
Second, group ranches offer a viable alternative to the
"Tragedy of the Commons" model. This system allows groups to
continue their pastoralist lifestyle and remain autonomous. In
most cases, however, the group ranch model has difficulty
balancing the needs of individuals and in managing assets.'
Finally, a policy of protected open range herding should be
considered. While this system of communal land ownership does
not provide for the development of individual land tenure, it
provides greater economic and ecological benefits than other
systems. Further, pastoral groups retain their autonomy and are
free to continue to live under traditional law and custom without
governmental interference. This policy will greatly protect the
rights of nomadic pastoralists in Eritrea. The Eritrean government
should strongly consider open range herding as a viable policy
alternative.
Currently, only speculation can be offered concerning the
Eritrean government's policy towards pastoralists. Given the
government's amicable relationship with these groups, a program
of passive settlement seems likely. The failures of the past have
shown that this is not the best policy for the pastoralists or the
nation that implements it. Given Eritrea's land and economic
resources, a policy of open range herding seems to be the best
alternative. One can only hope that the Eritrean government
considers all of the information available before deciding on the
fate of its forgotten masses.
JASON R. WILSON
187 See generally id. ("Later reconsiderations of pastoralism as a mode of
production have posited that, rather than being inferior to agriculture, it is a positive
response to an arid environment where agriculture alone would be untenable in
supporting the population.").
8 See Lawry, supra note 125, at 19.
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